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The share of income received by the top 1% and 10% of earners in the United States increased 
dramatically from 1980 to 2011. This growth in top income shares has been widespread across the 50 
states; the income share of the top 1% grew by 8.2 percentage points on average. It has also been 
conspicuously uneven, with some states experiencing significantly more growth than others. The smallest 
growth in top income shares took place in Delaware, where the share of income received by the top 1% of 
earners grew by 3.8 percentage points from 1980 to 2011. At the other end of the spectrum, the income 
share of the top 1% grew by 17.6 percentage points in New York.1 A compelling explanation for rising 
top income shares should account for the divergent paths taken by the states over the last 30 years. If 
rising top income shares are primarily the result of market forces rewarding certain groups of workers 
over others, then there should be differences in such market forces between states. If rising top income 
shares are primarily the result of policy decisions, there should be differences between states in terms of 
the policies they implement. In this paper, I test a number of common market and policy explanations for 
rising top income shares against these standards, with the hope of identifying whether there is stronger 
empirical support for certain explanations for rising top income shares than others.  
My analysis implies that tax policy has played an important role in growing top income shares. I 
present robust evidence that reductions in top marginal tax rates on capital gains income significantly 
increase the income share of both the top 1% and top 10% of earners. I additionally present evidence that 
decreases in top marginal tax rates on wage income has contributed to rising top income shares, though 
this evidence is less robust than for capital gains. Finally, I find some evidence that raising state 
government expenditures reduce top income shares, though the size of this effect is small.  
In addition to tax policy, I investigate several other explanations for rising top income shares. 
After constructing a new state panel data set on the college wage premium, I present evidence that the 
growing returns to college education have contributed somewhat to rising top income shares, particularly 
for the top 10% of earners. I additionally find some evidence that union membership and Democratic 
control of a state’s governorship may reduce top income shares, but the size of the effect of both factors is 
                                                            
1 Top 1% income share numbers in this paragraph are from Frank (2009). 
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small compared to other variables and the results are not robust across my models. Finally, my analysis 
implies that the growing role of finance in the economy and the declining value of the minimum wage 
have contributed very little to rising top income shares. 
After testing a number of different hypotheses for rising top income shares, my analysis implies 
that we actually know very little about why state trends have diverged so significantly. The fixed effects 
models I present allow me to distinguish between the variance explained between states in a given year 
and within states over time. These models imply that we know a lot more about the changes within states 
over time than we do about differences between states. The most successful model I present explains only 
about 36% of the between-state variation in the income share of the top 1% of earners. This implies that 
there is a lot of room for further investigation into why states have followed such different courses since 
1980. Going forward, policymakers and economists who aim to reverse the trend of growing top income 
shares should seek to identify better explanations for why state trends have diverged so significantly. The 
income distribution in the United States would look significantly more equal in 2011 if it had followed 
Delaware’s trend since 1980. 
Trends in Top Income Shares 
Economists largely agree about the trend in the United States’ top income shares during the 
twentieth century. The share of income received by top earners was very high in the late 1920s, but fell 
dramatically throughout the 1930s and 40s. After stabilizing during the 1950s and 60s, inequality began 
to rise during the 1970s, a trend that continues to this day. Piketty and Saez (2003) helped to establish the 
consensus on this version of events in the economic literature in 2003, when they published a data set 
describing the share of total income accrued by top earners during the 20th and 21st century. According to 
the most recent update of the data set, the share of total income going to top earners followed a “U-
shaped” pattern (Saez 2013). Figure 1 clearly shows the long term pattern Piketty and Saez describe. The 
top 10% of earners accrued about 46.1% of national income in 1928, which dipped to a postwar low of 
31.4% in 1953, and rose to a record high of 48.2% in 2012. The income earned by the top 1% of earners 
peaked in 1932 at 19.6%, dipped to a low of 7.7% in 1977, and reached 17.9% in 2012. 
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[Figure 1 Here] 
A number of other scholars have corroborated Pikkety and Saez’s description of the trend in top 
income shares. Mark Frank (2009) constructed a state level set of income inequality measures using data 
from the IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) publication, and his data showed the same “U-shaped” trend 
Piketty and Saez described. Mark Price and Estelle Sommeiller (2014) constructed a similar data set 
based on SOI data, but performed additional adjustments to make their estimates more closely match 
those of  Piketty and Saez.. Wojciech Kopczuk, Emmanuel Saez, and Jae Song (2010) used payroll 
microdata from the Social Security Administration (SSA) to estimate the share of income accrued by the 
top 1% of earners, and found that it rose from about 6.4% in 1980 to a peak of about 13.0% in 2000. This 
broadly matches the trend that Piketty and Saez uncovered, though top income shares were slightly lower 
because payroll data excludes capital gains income. Lawrence Mishel and Nicholas Finio (2014) extended 
Kopczuk et al.’s data set, and found that in recent years the share of earnings received by the top 1% of 
earners returned to its early 2000’s peak. In addition to the administrative data sets from the SSA and IRS, 
the Congressional Budget Office (2013) calculated their own estimate of top income shares using a 
combination of IRS data and Census Current Population Survey (CPS) data. Its numbers show more 
fluctuation than the administrative data sets, but a broadly similar trend. According the CBO, the share of 
income received by the top 1% of earners rose from 8.9% in 1979 to 14.9% in 2010. 
[Figure 2 Here] 
To better compare the trends described in these five data sets, I compiled data from each of the 
estimates of the income share of the top 1% mentioned above. The data sets from Frank and 
Sommeiller/Price data are aggregated from the state level using slightly different methodologies. 
Sommeiller and Price published an aggregated estimate of the nationwide trend, but Frank did not. 
Therefore, for the Frank data I calculated a yearly average weighted by state population to capture a 
nationwide average top income share. I display a comparison of these five data sets in Figure 2. In spite of 
the differences between the sets, all four estimates clearly show the income share of the top 1% of earners 
rising considerably since 1980. Four of the five data sets show that income share of the top 1% of earners 
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effectively doubled, with the sole outlier (the CBO data) being a data set that excludes capital gains 
income. 
Why is Inequality Growing? 
Economists have offered a number of competing explanations about why income shares have 
grown in recent years. The two widest bodies of literature on this topic has focused on two potential 
culprits for rising inequality—falling income tax rates, and rising returns to education resulting from skill 
based technological change. Other common explanations include weakening labor market institutions, in 
particular declining union membership and the falling real value of the minimum wage. There is a body of 
sociological research focusing on the rising importance of finance in the economy as a whole, as well as 
in markets outside of the financial sector. Several political scientists and economists have argued that the 
ideology or partisan affiliation of a government in power could have an effect on income inequality. I 
briefly describe each of these literature bases in turn. 
A. Taxes 
Economists proposed several theoretical explanations for how tax policy can affect top income 
shares. Taxes are a particularly confusing topic in the context of income inequality because taxes directly 
affect the income distribution by collecting money from workers for government operations. In addition 
to this direct effect, economists have analyzed whether top marginal tax rates can affect the pre-tax share 
of income received by top earners. Oliver Bargain (2013) and his co-authors used decomposition analysis 
to measure how tax policy had contributed to pre and post-tax income inequality. The authors found that 
12.5% of the change in the post-tax income share of the top 1% of earners is due to the direct effects of 
changes in tax policy between 1979 and 2007. Depending on the elasticity of top earners taxable income 
they assumed, the combined direct and indirect effects of tax policy accounted for between 12.5% and 
22.4% of the total change in the share of post-tax income earned by the top 1% of earners.  
Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Stefanie Stantcheva (2011) argue that there are three 
potential channels through which top marginal tax rates on wages can indirectly reduce top earners’ 
incomes. First, there is the labor supply elasticity. In this model, higher taxes make labor less profitable 
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relative to leisure for high income earners, and as a result they correspondingly supply fewer hours or less 
effort. Second, there is tax avoidance. As income taxes rise, higher income workers might seek to avoid 
taxation by changing their compensation to forms that are taxed at a lower rate. Third, there are 
“compensation bargaining responses,” where CEOs are able to influence compensation committees to pay 
them a wage that exceeds the marginal product of their labor. If top income taxes are high, CEOs have 
less marginal incentive to bargain.  In addition to offering a theoretical model that explains how taxes 
could affect pre-tax income shares, Piketty et al. compare the tax rates and pre-tax income shares across a 
variety of developed countries to estimate what effect top marginal tax rates have on pre-tax income 
inequality. Using data from 18 OECD countries, the authors find that changes in log top marginal tax 
rates between 1960-64 and 2005-09 are highly correlated with changes in the log income share earned by 
the top 1%. They estimate that the elasticity of top income shares for top earners with regards to their top 
marginal tax rate is .47. 
Thomas Volscho and Nathan Kelly (2012) add a fourth theoretical explanation as to how tax 
progressivity can affect top income shares. “…Taxes collect revenue that fund government 
appropriations...To the extent that higher tax rates spur spending on human capital formation…tax rates 
may reduce top shares” (Volscho and Kelly 2012, 683). Using data from Piketty and Saez, they proceed 
to model the effects of capital gains and wage tax rates on top income shares. Using single equation error 
correction models, they find that top marginal tax rates on capital gains and wage income reduce the 
income share of the top 1% of earners by -.032 and -.064, respectively, in their preferred model. Karel 
Mertens (2013) similarly conducted a vector auto-regression analysis of Piketty and Saez’s long term 
income data, and found further evidence that cuts in top marginal tax rates increase the pre-tax share of 
income received by top earners. His resulting analysis implies that an exogenous 1 percentage point cut to 
top marginal tax rates increase the income of top earners by .52% in the first year, and “by .97% and 
1.02% in the following two years, after which there is a gradual decline.”2 
                                                            
2 (Mertens 2013) Page 29. 
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Denvil Duncan and Klara Sabirianova Peter (2012) use cross-national data to estimate the effects 
of progressive taxation on income inequality as measured by GINI coefficient. Based on the assumption 
that countries compete for tax base by establishing relatively similar rates, the authors use the tax rates of 
neighboring states as an exogenous instrument for the progressivity of a country’s tax code. They authors 
find that a one percentage point increase in a country’s top marginal tax rate results in a statistically 
significant .95 percentage point decrease in a state’s GINI coefficient. Christoph Gorgas and Christoph 
Schaltegger (2012) used a panel data set of Swiss cantons to estimate the effect of changing marginal tax 
rates on income shares in Switzerland between 1917 and 2007. Using a similar instrumental variable to 
Duncan and Sabirianova Peter, they found that 1% increase in the top marginal tax rate resulted in a 
decrease of .3% in the share of income accrued by top earners in their IV models. 
B. Education and skill based technological change 
The wage premium received by college educated workers grew significantly during the later part 
of the 20th century. Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz (2008) argue that the relationship between the 
college wage premium and technological change played a big role in fluctuating inequality. Throughout 
the twentieth century, technological change created a growing need for highly skilled workers. After 
1980, the supply of college-educated workers grew at a slower pace than in the post-war period. As a 
result, employers needed to pay more to attract such workers, and the gap between high and low wage 
earners grew. Goldin and Katz called this dynamic the “race between education and technology.” They 
argue that “from 1940 to 2005, changes in the wage structure were closely correlated with changes in the 
premium to college” (Goldin and Katz 2008, 291). Goldin and Katz also point to a decomposition 
analysis by Thomas Lemieux, which according to Goldin and Katz shows that “in recent decades, the 
lion’s share of rising wage inequality can be traced to an increase in educational wage diferentials” 
(Goldin and Katz 2008, 291). Lemieux (2006) uses the change in wage variance as his measure of income 
inequality. His analysis shows that about 54% of the total change in wage variance is attributable to 
growing returns to post-secondary education (Lemieux 2006, 19). 
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Notably, both Lemieux and Goldin and Katz do not use top income shares as their dependent 
variable of interest. Goldin and Katz use the 90-10 log wage differential, and Lemieux uses variation in 
wages. Some authors have suggested that skill-based technological change may be playing a role in such 
measures of inequality, but cannot explain rising top income shares. Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson, for 
example, make this claim, arguing “the return to schooling—and especially to a college degree—has 
risen. But, as we’ve seen, rising American inequality is not about the gap between the college-educated 
and the rest…It is about the pulling away at the very top” (Hacker and Pierson 2011, 34). 
C. Other factors 
In addition to taxes and education, economists have proposed a number of other explanations for 
rising top income shares. Declining unionization rates during the second half of the twentieth century are 
one popular explanation. Volscho and Kelly (2012, 692) fond that unionization had a large and 
statistically significant negative effect on top income shares. P. Chintrakarn (2011) used Frank’s state-
level panel data set to estimate the effects of unionization on a state’s GINI coefficient. He found that 
unionization had a small but statistically significant negative effect on a state’s inequality as measured by 
GINI coefficient. Bruce Western and Jake Rosenfeld (2011)  used decomposition analysis, and found that 
declining unionization has significant effects on both union and non-union wages. They argue that this 
effect is similar in size to the effects of rising returns to education (Western and Rosenfeld 2011, 30). 
Other authors have focused on the growing role of finance in the economy. Following Gretta 
Krippner (2012) this literature examines both the growth of the financial sector as well as the role played 
by finance in non-financial industries. Ken-Hou Lin and Donald Tomaskovic-Devey (2013) use industry 
level data to estimate the effects of “financialization” on income inequality. They define financialization 
as ”the ratio of financial receipts—which include interest, dividends, and capital gains—to business 
receipts, the revenue generated form the selling of goods and services” (Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey 2013, 
1297). The authors find that between 1971 and 1997, financialization significantly increased within-
industry inequality as measured by earnings dispersion in a given industry. Between 1999 and 2008, 
however, this relationship is no longer statistically significant.  
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D. Analyses comparing multiple factors using cross-national analysis   
While some authors have focused on one specific explanation for rising inequality, other analyses 
have used cross-national panel analysis to model several different explanations simultaneously. Scheve 
and Stasavage (2007) use a sample of 14 industrialized democracies between 1919 and 2000 to estimate 
the effects of a number of different labor market institutions on the share of income received by the top 
1% and 10% of earners. Their model shows that decentralized wage bargaining and union density reduce 
top income shares. They found no evidence that having a left-leaning Prime Minister or President reduced 
inequality. Timothy Neal (2013) performed a similar analysis, instead using panel co-integration methods. 
Neal collected top income share data from 10 industrialized countries between 1950 and 2009. Neal found 
that union density, government expenditures, top marginal tax rates, and national GDP per hour worked 
had statistically significant negative effects on the share of income received by top earners. He found that 
ideologically conservative governments were correlated with rising top income shares, while openness to 
trade and the amount of private credit extended had mixed results. 
Methodology 
Defining Inequality 
As my discussion of the literature implied, scholars have devised several different quantitative 
measures of the equality of a distribution of income or wealth. Some concentrate on gaps between certain 
percentiles of the income distribution, for example the 90-10 or 50-10 income gap. Other measures, such 
as the GINI coefficient, compare the shape the overall income distribution relative to a perfectly equal 
distribution. While each of these measures is valuable in its own right, I have chosen to focus on the 
income shares of the top 1% and 10% of all individuals. As I discuss in more detail below, this choice 
was partially the result of the availability of data. There are only two state-level data sets of inequality 
measures over time, and they only contain reliable estimates of top income shares. This decision also 
mirrors a growing body of literature which has chosen to focus on top income shares following the 
publication of Piketty and Saez’s time series data in 2003. 
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In addition to defining how I measure inequality, I want to explicitly clarify that my analysis 
focuses on the income share of the top 1% of earners prior to taxes. Although I use tax policy as an 
explanatory variable, the data sets I use for my dependent variables measures the share of income 
received by top earners prior to taxation.3 Taxation may additionally reduce the post-tax income share of 
top earners by collecting a portion of their earnings. While such effects are interesting and worthy of 
further analysis, I am limited by my data set to a focus on income shares prior to taxation. While the 
indirect effects of taxation on the income distribution are perhaps less obvious than the direct effects, I 
discussed several potential avenues through which taxes may affect pre-tax top income shares above. 
[Figure 3 Here] 
Most of the existing literature explaining rising top income shares has focused on the nationwide 
trends or cross-national comparisons. Analyses that rely on data aggregated from  across the United States 
throws out the wide variation in trends occurring at the state level. Figure 6 makes clear that income 
shares have not followed a single trend since 1980; the share of income accrued by the top 1% of earners 
has varied greatly between states. Even more interesting, the trends in different states have begun to 
diverge significantly. In 1980, the gap between the state with the largest share of income earned by the 
top 1% of earners and the smallest share was 4.6%. By 2011, that gap had grown to 16.0%. The standard 
deviation in state top income shares grew from 1.1% to 3.6% over the same period.  
[Table 1 Here] 
Analyzing the fifty state-level trends can provide insight into why top income shares have grown 
in the United States as a whole. Just as there is substantial variation in income inequality trends in the 
United States, there is substantial demographic and policy variation between states.  While the income 
threshold required to be counted in the top 1% of earners may vary somewhat between states, analyzing 
the distribution within a state can provide insight in to the distribution of incomes subject to a particular 
policy regime. As my comparison in Figure 2 made clear, the aggregated trend of the 50 states is a good 
                                                            
3 This is also true of the data set constructed by Piketty and Saez (2003). 
11 
 
approximation of the trend nationwide; a population-weighted average of Frank’s data closely mirrors 
other estimates of the nationwide trends.  
In this paper, I use panel analysis to exploit the variation between states and within states over 
time to estimate the relative contributions of various policy and demographic factors to rising top income 
shares. As my dependent variable, I use the share of income received by the top 1% and top 10% of 
earners in a given state and year. I use top marginal income and capital gains tax rates as my main 
explanatory variables. I estimate four models to test the robustness of the effect of tax policy on top 
income shares. As an additional check, I run each of the models described above on two separate panel 
data sets of top income shares. Model 1 is a simple pooled OLS model, which does not attempt to adjust 
for unobserved heterogeneity between states or time periods. Model 2 is a first differences model, which 
estimates how changes in top income shares move together with changes in tax rates and my other 
variables of interest. Model 3 is a one-way state fixed effects model, which controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity between states by demeaning the dependent and independent variables.4 Model 4 is a two-
way fixed effects model.   
Model 1: Pooled OLS 
ܫ݊ܿ݋݄݉݁ܵܽݎ݁௜௧ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܶ݋݌	ܴܽݐ݁ݓܽ݃݁ݏ௜௝ ൅ ߚଶܶ݋݌ܴܽݐ݁ܥܽ݌ܩܽ݅݊ݏ௜௝ ൅෍ߚ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߝ 
In this model, ܫ݊ܿ݋݄݉݁ܵܽݎ݁௜௝ is the share of income received by either the top 1% or top 10% of earners 
in a given state and year. ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܶ݋݌	ܴܽݐ݁ݓܽ݃݁ݏ௜௝ is the combined federal and state top marginal tax rate 
on wage income in a given state and year. ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽܶ݋݌ܴܽݐ݁ܥܽ݌ܩܽ݅݊ݏ௜௝ is the combined federal and state 
top marginal tax rate on capital gains income in a given state and year. ∑ߚ ௜ܺ௝ is a vector of control 
variables.  
Model 2: First Differences 
Model 2 uses the same variables of interest as the OLS model, but instead models their changes: 
∆ܫ݊ܿ݋݄݉݁ܵܽݎ݁௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅	∆ߚଵܶ݋݌	ܴܽݐ݁ݓܽ݃݁ݏ௜௝ ൅ ∆ߚଶܶ݋݌ܴܽݐ݁ܥܽ݌ܩܽ݅݊ݏ௜௝ ൅ ∑∆ߚ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߝ 
                                                            
4 This is the default method for estimating fixed effects models in STATA.  
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In this first differences model, changes in income share are modeled as a function of changes in wage and 
capital gains tax rates, as well as of changes in a vector of control variables.  
Model 3: One-Way Fixed Effects 
Model 3 is a one-way state fixed effects model. The functional form looks similar to the OLS model, but 
it instead separates the error term in to ߙ௜, the time invariant error term for each state and ߥ௜௧, the time 
variant component of the error term. 
ܫ݊ܿ݋݄݉݁ܵܽݎ݁௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ	ܶ݋݌	ܴܽݐ݁ݓܽ݃݁ݏ௜௝ ൅ ߚଶܶ݋݌ܴܽݐ݁ܥܽ݌ܩܽ݅݊ݏ௜௝ ൅෍ߚ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߙ௜ ൅ ߥ௜௧ 
By demeaning the independent and dependent variables, I am able to subtract out the time invariant 
component of the error term. This allows me to estimate the following model: 
ܫ݊ܿ݋݄݉݁ܵܽݎ݁ప௧෫ ൌ	ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܶ݋݌	ܴܽݐ݁ݓܽ݃݁ݏపఫ෫ ൅ߚଶܶ݋݌ܴܽݐ݁ܥܽ݌ܩܽଓ݊ݏపఫ෫ ൅෍ߚ పܺ௧෪ ൅ ߥ௜௧ 
In this model ܫ݊ܿ݋݄݉݁ܵܽݎ݁ప௧෫ ,	ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܶ݋݌	ܴܽݐ݁ݓܽ݃݁ݏపఫ෫ , ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽܶ݋݌ܴܽݐ݁ܥܽ݌ܩܽଓ݊ݏపఫ෫  and పܺ௧෪  represent 
demeaned versions of the variables from previous models.  
Model 4:Two-Way Fixed Effects Model 
ܫ݊ܿ݋݄݉݁ܵܽݎ݁௜௧ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܶ݋݌ܴܽݐ݁ݓܽ݃݁ݏ௜௝ ൅ ߚଶܶ݋݌ܴܽݐ݁ܥܽ݌ܩܽ݅݊ݏ௜௝ ൅෍ߚ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߙ௜ ൅ ηt, ൅ߥ௜௧ 
The two-way fixed effects model is very similar to model 3, but it additionally contains the term η୲, 
which represents the common unobserved trend for a given year. This aspect of the error term is captured 
by year dummy variables, which allows me to estimate the following model. 
ܫ݊ܿ݋݄݉݁ܵܽݎ݁ప௧෫ ൌ	ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ	ܶ݋݌	ܴܽݐ݁ݓܽ݃݁ݏపఫ෫ ൅ߚଶܶ݋݌ܴܽݐ݁ܥܽ݌ܩܽଓ݊ݏపఫ෫ ൅෍ߚ పܺ௧෪ ൅ ݕ݁ܽݎ௧ ൅ ߥ௜௧ 
In this equation, ߥ௜௧ represents the time varying unobserved aspects of the error term (not captured by 
state effects and year trends). 
Strengths and Weaknesses of Each Model 
In panel analysis, there is tension between controlling for omitted variable bias and including 
enough variation in a model to test the effects of various policies. The wide variation in top income shares 
between states provides an opportunity to test the effects of various state-level policies, but also 
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introduces the potential for omitted variable bias. New York, for example, has very high top income 
shares across all years—perhaps certain aspects of New York’s economy or policy regime are the reason 
for such high inequality. Alternately, perhaps New York City’s strong cultural attractions draw higher 
income people to the state. I control for such time-invariant omitted variables through state fixed effects 
and first differences, but these model specifications wash away any time invariant components of my 
treatment variables. Imagine a hypothetical scenario where New York’s large financial sector did not 
grow as a share of the economy over the 31 years of my analysis. Controlling for ߙ௜ would wash out any 
effects of the financial sector on the state, even if those precise effects are part of the reason that New 
York’s baseline level of inequality is higher across all periods. Controlling for unobserved time trends 
poses a similar tradeoff as for unobserved heterogeneity between states. If the collapse of the tech bubble 
in the early 2000s, for example, disproportionately impacted high earners, the addition of year fixed 
effects would capture omitted variable bias by subtracting out the common observed trend for that year. 
At the same time, year fixed effects washes out a substantial amount of the variation in my model’s 
independent variables within states. Any changes in federal top marginal tax rates, for example, would be 
effectively washed out by the inclusion of year fixed effects. 
[Table 2 Here] 
In other words, state fixed effects or first differencing reduce the total between group variance; 
year fixed effects reduce the total within group variance. Table 2 describes the tradeoff between bias and 
variance, and the relative strengths of each model. This theoretical background is useful for understanding 
the results presented below. As I increase the degree to which my analysis controls for omitted variable 
bias, p values predictably grow, and several coefficients change signs. Given that state and year fixed 
effects wash out much of the variation in our variables of interest, an insignificant result in Model 4 does 
not necessarily indicate that a variable does not affect inequality—there may simply be insufficient 
variation within states over time to properly estimate the effects of a policy change. However, we can say 
with a higher degree of certainty that variables which are statistically significant in Model 4 are associated 
with top income shares, because they are less likely to suffer from omitted variable bias.  
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 [Table 3 Here] 
Variables Included and Data Sources 
Top Income Shares 
To my knowledge, only two state level data sets of top income shares exist; one from Mark Frank 
(2009) and one compiled by Estelle Sommeiller and Mark Price of the Economic Policy Institute (2014). 
Both Frank and Sommeiller/Price use the IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) publication to produce estimates 
of the share of adjusted gross income (AGI) income accrued by top earners for each state and year. AGI 
includes wage and salary income, capital gains and entrepreneurial income. The SOI publication reports 
the number of tax units in a given income range, meaning that both data sets must use interpolation to 
estimate the precise top income share. Frank uses a “split histogram interpolation method” (Frank 2009, 
65), while Sommeiller and Price use Pareto Interpolation. Sommeiller and Price additionally performed a 
number of adjustments based on the Piketty and Saez data set, Census CPS Demographic data, and 
Bureau of Economic Analysis personal income data. Their resulting estimates are missing for the years 
1983-1985.5 While the data sets show broadly similar trends (r=.8134 between the data sets for the years 
1980-2011, excluding 1983-1985), there is enough disagreement between the two data sets about specific 
data points that I have chosen to run my analysis using both estimates of the dependent variable. Table 4 
compares the mean differences between these two data sets by state. Sommeiller and Price tend to show 
larger top income shares in high-inequality states in the northeast, such as New York, Connecticut, 
Massachusetts and New Jersey. 
[Table 4 and Figure 4 Here] 
Data sets based on administrative tax return data are likely to be more reliable than those based 
on survey data for at least two reasons. First data collected from the CPS is generally top-coded, which 
prevents detailed analysis of trends at the top of the income distribution. Second, Frank points to an 
analysis by Hafiz Akhand and Haoming Liu  (2002) which indicates that individuals at the high end of the 
income distribution tend to understate their income on the CPS, while individuals at the lower end of the 
                                                            
5 This data is not publicly available, but Frank was able to obtain it from the IRS by special request. 
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income distribution tend to overstate it. Although higher income individuals in particular may have some 
incentive to understate their income when filing their taxes, the penalty for doing so is larger than it is for 
the CPS. As Frank puts it, “The IRS, unlike the March CPS or Bureau of the Census, will penalize 
respondents for income reporting errors.”6 
Top Marginal Tax Rates 
For my treatment variable I used a data set of top marginal federal and state tax rates for each 
state between 1977 and 2011 that was built using Daniel Feenberg’s (1993) TAXSIM simulator. This data 
set estimates the marginal tax rate paid on an additional $1,000 of income paid by a married couple filing 
jointly with a combined income of $1,500,000. It further assumes that this couple claims a mortgage 
interest deduction of $150,000, and that dollars paid in state income taxes are deducted from federal tax 
rates. The deductibility of state taxes is extremely important, because it means that increases in state 
marginal tax rates are partially offset by decreases in the effective federal tax rate. This deduction makes 
quite a large difference in the effective tax rate paid by a given taxpayer. In 2011, the hypothetical couple 
described above would have paid a marginal state tax rate on wage income of 11% in Hawaii, but 0% in 
Alaska. After accounting for the deductibility of state taxes, however, the effective federal tax rate would 
be 31.15% in Hawaii and 35% in Alaska. As a result, the gap between these states in total marginal tax 
rate would only be 7.15%, even though their state top marginal rates were 11% apart. Given the 
interrelationship of these two variables, it does not make sense to model their effects separately, and as a 
result I’ve used the total combined state and federal tax rate as my treatment variable. 
[Table 4 here] 
There is significantly greater variation in top marginal tax rates between states than within them. 
Table 5 displays the variation in top marginal tax rates on wages and capital gains. The “Between” values 
indicate how much states vary from the nationwide average tax rate in a given year. The “Within” values 
indicate the degree to which tax rates in a given state deviate from the average tax rate in that state across 
all periods observed. For both capital gains and wages, the standard deviation of the tax rate within the 
                                                            
6 (Frank 2009) Page 58. 
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state is about three times greater than the standard deviation between the states. Figure 9 provides visual 
confirmation of the pattern in table 5. Most of the variation in combined tax rates on wages is the result of 
changes in the federal top marginal tax rate, which affects all states simultaneously.  
[Figure 5 Here] 
State Expenditures and Tax Collections 
Top marginal tax rates affect the share of pre-tax income received by top earners through both 
behavioral channels and their effects on government revenue generation. As I explained above, Piketty et 
al (2011) describe three behavioral channels through which high top marginal tax rates reduce the pre-tax 
income shares of top earners: labor supply, tax evasion, and bargaining effects. Volscho and Kelly (2012) 
provide a fourth potential explanation; higher top tax rates raise additional revenue that can finance 
government expenditures on behalf of lower and moderate income individuals. Still, by controlling for the 
degree to which a state collects tax revenue or spends money, I test Volscho and Kelly’s hypothesis that 
government expenditures may reduce top income tax shares. To measure state expenditures and revenue 
collections, I used historical data from the United States Census Bureau (2013; 2014). I used two 
variables—the total tax revenue collected by a state government in a given year, and the total state 
expenditures in a given year. To normalize such data across states of different populations, I calculated 
expenditures and revenues per capita using Census population estimates aggregated by the University of 
Kentucky Center for Poverty Research (2014). To allow for comparisons across years, I converted state 
taxes and expenditures in to 2013 dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI-U measure of inflation. 
I obtained inflation conversion factors from Robert Sehr’s (2014) website hosted by Oregon State 
University’s Political Science Department. After adjusting for inflation, I converted tax revenue and 
expenditures per capita to log dollars to limit the influence of outlier states.  
College Wage Premium and % of State with Bachelor’s Degree or Higher 
To measure the effects of growing returns to education on top income shares, I needed state level 
estimates of the college wage premium as well as the share of the population with college degrees or 
higher. To my knowledge, no state level panel data set of the college wage premium currently exists. In 
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order to estimate the importance of returns to education, I built such a data set using the Outgoing 
Rotation Group (ORG) files from the Census CPS. To maintain consistency between the education 
variables, I used the ORG files to estimate both the college wage premium and the share of the population 
in a given state and year with a bachelor’s degree or higher.  
The ORG survey is the only portion of the CPS that directly asks workers about wages, and 
economists consequently tend to use the ORG survey for calculating the wage premium7. Rather than 
using the raw Census data, I used the ORG data files hosted by the Center for Economic and Policy 
Research (CEPR) (Center for Economic and Policy Research 2014). I opted to use CEPR’s files because 
they contain an “adjusted wage” variable that fixes several errors, inconsistencies, and omissions in the 
raw ORG data. These problems include top-coding of wages, likely data errors at very high and low wage 
levels, inconsistent treatment of tip wages, and workers who report that their “hours vary.” As a result of 
these fixes, CEPR’s wage estimate is more consistent than the raw estimates from the NBER (Schmitt 
2003).  
To estimate the returns to college education in a given state and year, I used a model with a 
similar structure as Goldin and Katz and Autor et al. (2008 and 1998, respectively): 
ܮ݊ሺܹܽ݃݁ሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܪܵ	ܦ݁݃ݎ݁݁ ൅ ߚଶܵ݋݉݁ܥ݋݈݈݁݃݁ ൅ ߚଷܤ݄݈ܽܿ݁݋ݎᇱݏ ൅ ߚସܣ݀ݒܽ݊ܿ݁݀ ൅ ߚହܣ݃݁ ൅ ߚ଺ܣ݃݁ଶ ൅ ߚ଻ܣ݃݁ଷ
൅ ߚ଼ܣ݃݁ସ ൅ ߚଽܨ݈݁݉ܽ݁ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܰ݋ܹ݄݊݅ݐ݁ ൅ ߚଵଵܲܽݎݐܶ݅݉݁ ൅෍ܣ݃݁ ∗ ܨ݈݁݉ܽ݁ ൅෍ܣ݃݁ ∗ ܰ݋݊ݓ݄݅ݐ݁ 
This model estimates a worker’s log wage as a function of his or her education level, a quartic estimator 
of experience, and dummy variables indicating if a worker was female, non-white, or a part-time worker. 
It additionally includes interaction terms for the quartic of experience and the female and non-white 
indicators. Although Goldin and Katz recommend using dummy variables for each year of education, the 
CEPR data set includes only dummy variables indicating that a worker has less than a high school degree, 
a high school diploma, a bachelor’s degree, or an advanced degree. While finer-grained education data 
was available for the years 1992 and later, including dummy variables for specific advanced degrees 
resulted in inconsistent and outlier values for smaller states. In order to obtain more consistent estimates, I 
                                                            
7 This is the data set used, for example, by Goldin and Katz (2008) and Autor et al. (1998). 
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used a somewhat simplified version of Goldin and Katz’s equation, with dummy variables indicating 
whether an individual had a high school diploma, bachelor’s degree, or an advanced degree. Finally, 
following Goldin and Katz, I restricted my analysis to only individuals who were employed at the time of 
the survey.  
Using this model, I am able to estimate how much a worker’s log wage is likely to increase as the 
result of receiving a college or high school education. Following Goldin and Katz, I weighted the estimate 
of the college wage premium by the share of workers receiving in a given state and year with either 
college or advanced degrees. Algebraically, the estimation is as follows: 
ܥܹ ௜ܲ௧ ൌ ܤ ௜ܲ௧ ∗ ܤ݄݄ܽܿܵܽݎ݁௜௧ ൅ ܣ ௜ܲ௧ ∗ ܣ݀ݒ݄ܵܽݎ݁௜௧ܤ݄ܽܿݏ݄ܽݎ݁௜௧ ൅ ܣ݀ݒ݄ܵܽݎ݁௜௧ െ ܪܵ ௜ܲ௧ 
In this estimation, ܥܹ ௜ܲ௧ is the college wage premium in a given state and year. ܤ݄݄ܽܿܵܽݎ݁௜௧	and 
ܣ݀ݒ݄ܵܽݎ݁௜௧ are the share of workers in a state with either a bachelor’s or advanced degree. ܪܵ ௜ܲ௧, ܤ ௜ܲ௧, 
and ܣ ௜ܲ௧, are the wage premiums received by high school, bachelors, and advanced degree holders, 
respectively. Figure 5 displays the 50 state trends of the college wage premium in grey, with the US 
average college wage premium overlaid in black. My data set broadly matches the trend in Goldin and 
Katz. In my data set the average log college wage premium across all states rose about .23 from 1980 to 
2011 (from .25 to .48). Goldin and Katz’s data implies that the log wage premium grew by .009 per year 
between 1980 and 2005, which is equal to about .225 over that 25 year period (Goldin and Katz 2008, 
297). 
Union Membership: 
 To test the effects of union activity on inequality, I added a panel data set of union coverage and 
membership by state from Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson (2003). As Table 6 indicates, there is 
significant variation in union membership rates both across and between states. The “Between” numbers 
the degree to which states deviate from the average level of union membership in a given year. The 
“Within” numbers measure how much states vary from their mean union membership across all years. 
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While the variation in union membership is greater between states than it is within states, the variation is 
more than sufficient to test the effects of union membership using two-way fixed effects. 
Effects of the Financial Sector 
To estimate the effects of the financial sector, I collected data from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) on the share of a state’s GDP represented by the financial services sector. (US 
Department of Commerce 2014) In 1997, the BEA switched from using the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) to the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). As a result of this 
change, it is difficult to compare industry shares from years before and after 1997. For the financial 
sector, the biggest differences between these two classification systems are how they classify holding 
companies and real estate. Under the SIC coding system, the real estate sector and holding companies 
were classified as part of “Finance, Insurance and Real Estate,” while NAICs system codes real estate as 
its own category and holding companies as management services.  
In order to allow comparisons between these two classification groups, I subtracted the real estate 
and holding company portions of GDP for all years prior to 1997. The only year in which data is available 
using both classification systems is 1997. After subtracting real estate and holding companies from the 
SIC estimates of the financial sectors, the differences between the SIC and NAICS estimates of the size of 
the financial sector in a given state were very close, with a mean difference of -.2 percentage points. The 
only states where the classification systems showed a difference greater than 1% were Nevada, New 
York, and Delaware, where NAICS implied that finance was 1.1 percentage points, 1.2 percentage points, 
and 5.3 percentage points smaller than SIC, respectively. Given that Delaware was already an extreme 
outlier in terms of the size of its financial sector (32% of GDP in 1997 according to SIC, almost double 
the next largest financial sector), these differentials in measurement should not significantly hamper 
comparisons across these two classification systems. Given the lack of other available data, this was the 
best available estimate of the size of the financial sector across both state and the time periods under 
consideration. 
Other Variables 
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I include in my model several variables in addition to those mentioned above. Because some 
economists (e.g. Goldin and Katz 2008, 351) have suggested that the eroding value of the minimum wage 
may have worsened market driven inequality, I include a control for the inflation-adjusted minimum wage 
in a given state and year.8 To test for the effects of partisan control of state government, I include a 
control that indicates whether the governor is a Democrat in a given state or year. Both the minimum 
wage and partisanship variables were collected from the University of Kentucky Center for Poverty 
Research’s (UKCPR) database of state policy variables (UKCPR 2014). To control for the overall 
economic climate, I included the unemployment rate in a given state and year, as well as inflation-
adjusted personal income per capita (both were collected from the UKCPR data set). As with the tax and 
expenditure variables, I adjusted the personal income data for inflation and estimated the variable in log 
form.  
While gross state product is a more conventional measure of a state’s economic output in a given 
year, I chose to use personal income because it more specifically measures the income received by 
individuals in a given state. Personal income excludes corporate profits, social insurance payments, and 
indirect taxes. By excluding such variables, I may miss some of the economic activity in a given state and 
year, but I gain a variable that more closely tracks adjusted gross income, which is a component of my 
dependent variable. By using this variable I hope to both control for the economic environment in a given 
state and year well as the “size of the income pie.”  
Results: 
I present the results of my analysis in Tables 8 and 9. Before presenting the results, I want to 
highlight two methodological issues that arose while analyzing my data. First, I conducted tests for both 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, and all of my models showed the presence of both problems in 
both data sets. As a result, I used Stata’s heteroskedasticity robust (Huber/White) standard errors and 
clustered standard errors by state. Josh Angrist and Jörn-Steffen Pischke (2008, Kindle Location 5039) 
argue that the naïve application of clustered standard errors in Stata is sufficient to correct for serial 
                                                            
8 The minimum wage variable is calculated as the higher of the state and federal minimum wage. 
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correlation when working with 50-state panel data sets. Second, I chose not to present the results from my 
first differences model using Sommeiller and Price’s data because data was missing for the years 1983-
1985. While the absence of these years was problematic for all of my models, the first differences model 
was particularly problematic because differencing reduced the number of years available from both before 
and after the data gap. In addition, differencing meant that four years were missing rather than three. For 
the sake of transparency the results from this model are included in the appendix in Table 9.  
[Tables 8 and 9 Here] 
Capital Gains Tax Rates 
Of all the explanatory variables considered in my analysis, decreases in top marginal rates on 
capital gains income are the most consistently associated with rising top income shares. Depending upon 
the model considered, a 1 percentage point increase in the top marginal tax rate on capital gains income is 
associated with between a .10 and .59 percentage point decrease in the share of income received by the 
top 1% of earners. This finding is strongly statistically significant (p<.01) in both data sets in all four 
models tested. Top marginal tax rates on capital gains appear to have similar effects on the income shares 
of the top 10% of earners, though the findings are slightly less robust. A 1 percentage point increase in the 
top marginal tax rate is associated with a decrease of between .08 percentage points and .65 percentage 
points in the income share of the top 10% of earners. The coefficient is highly statistically significant 
(p<.01) in five of the seven models tested, and at least borderline significant in the other two.9  
Tax Rates on Wages 
I find some evidence that top marginal tax rates on wages significantly reduce top income shares, 
but the size of this effect is smaller and notably less robust than for capital gains tax rates. For the top 1% 
of earners, three of the seven models tested show that higher top marginal tax rates on wages are 
associated with declines in top income shares. These models imply that a 1 percentage point increase in 
top tax rates on wages is associated with a decrease of between .09 and .13 percentage points in the 
                                                            
9 It is significant in Model 1 (p<.05) using Frank’s data and borderline so in Model 3 (p<.1) with Frank’s data. 
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income share of the top 1% of earners. These effects are highly statistically significant (p<.001).  The 
Sommeiller and Price data set in particular seems to tell a different story. In Model 3, a 1 percentage point 
increase in the top marginal tax rate on wages is actually associated with a .03 percentage point increase 
in top income shares for this data set. The two-way fixed effects model (4) shows no significant effect in 
either data set. 
The results of my model of the income share of the top 10% are similar to but more consistent 
than the results for the top 1% of earners. Models 1-3 imply that a 1 percentage point increase in the top 
marginal tax rate on wage income is associated with decreases of between .03 and .60 percentage points 
in the income share of the top 10% of earners. These results are highly statistically significant (p<.01) in 
four of the model/data set combinations tested, and close to significant one other.10 Model 4 shows no 
significant effect in the Sommeiller and Price data set, and actually shows a statistically significant and 
large positive effect (ߚ ൌ .475ሻ	in the Frank data set. 
State Expenditures Per Capita 
I find some evidence that expenditures by state governments can reduce top income shares, but 
this evidence is not particularly robust. In four of the fourteen models tested, increases in state 
expenditures per capita are associated with statistically significant (p<.01) decreases in top income shares. 
For the top 1% of earners, the first differences model implies that a 1% increase in state expenditures 
reduces top income shares by .28 percentage points, while the two way fixed effects model using 
Sommeiller and Price’s data implies that this effect is .50 percentage points. For the top 10% of earners, 
these effects are .12 and .48 percentage points, respectively. These results are confusing, because the 
income share of the top 10% includes the income share of the top 1%, meaning we would expect larger 
effects for this group unless expenditures had a small (or potentially negative) effect on the income share 
of the 90th through 99th percentiles of earners. 
College Wage Premium 
                                                            
10 Using Sommeiller and Price’s data, the results are borderline significant in Model 3 (p<.1). 
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The college wage premium appears to be contributing somewhat to rising top income shares. The 
size of this effect varied dramatically between models. The college wage premium variable was 
statistically significant or almost so in four of the seven models tested. A 1% increase in the college wage 
premium was associated with between a .07 and .10 percentage point increase in the income share of the 
top 10% of earners. These effects were highly statistically significant in the fixed effects model (p<.01) 
and borderline significant in the OLS model (p<.1). Neither data set showed a significant effect in Model 
4. Five of the seven models of the income share of the top 10% showed a statistically significant positive 
effect of the college wage premium. The effects measured were larger than for the top 1% of earners. 
Depending on the model tested, a 1% increase in the college wage premium was associated with between 
a .06 and .25 percentage point increase in the income share of the top 1% of earners.  
Union Membership  
Contrary to previous research, I find very little evidence that union membership is driving rising 
top income shares. For both the top 1% and top 10% of earners, the union membership variable is only 
statistically significant in the first differences model and in the OLS model using Frank’s data. When 
statistically significant effects are present, they are small. My models imply that a 1 percentage point 
increase in a state’s union membership would reduce the income share of the top 1% by between .06 and 
.08 percentage points. These effects are, however, highly statistically significant (p<.01) in Models 1 and 
2. These models imply that a 1 percentage point increase in union membership would reduce the income 
share of the top 10% by between .03 and .15 percentage points. The OLS results are highly statistically 
significant (p<.01) in Frank’s data, while the first difference results are borderline so (p<.1). None of the 
results for Model 4 imply that union membership has a statistically significant effect on top income 
shares. Given that only one model containing controls for time invariant characteristics of states was 
statistically significant; the evidence that unions have played a large role in rising top income shares is 
weak. 
Size of the Financial Sector 
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I find scant evidence that the size of the financial sector effects top income shares. In all fourteen 
models tested across both data sets and both dependent variables, the finance as a share of GDP variable 
is statistically significant in none of them. The strongest evidence in favor of this explanation is that all of 
the coefficients have a positive sign, but the highest t-value of any coefficient on this variable is 1.52. 
Presence of a Democratic Governor 
I find little evidence that the presence of a Democratic governor reduces the income share of the 
top 1% of earners. This variable is only borderline significant (p<.1) in the one-way fixed effects model 
using Sommeiller and Price’s data set. This model implies that the presence of a Democratic governor in a 
given year and state reduces the income share of the top 1% by .31 percentage points. The evidence that 
the presence of a Democratic governor reduces the income share of the top 10% is slightly stronger. The 
presence of a Democratic governor is associated with a decrease of between .38 and .63 percentage points 
in the income share of the top 10% of earners.  These effects are significant in both data sets using the 
one-way fixed effects model, with p<.1 and p<.01 in Frank and Sommeiller/Price, respectively. It is also 
highly significant in the OLS model using the Frank data set. 
Minimum Wage 
My results for the minimum wage are too inconsistent to be meaningful. The first differences 
models seem to imply that raising the minimum wage reduces the income share of both the top 1% and 
the top 10%, but the results are internally contradictory. These models imply that an inflation adjusted $1 
increase in the minimum wage reduces the income share of the top 1% by .35 percentage points and the 
top 10% by .11 percentage points. Yet more confusing are the results for the fixed effects models. In 
Model 4, ostensibly the most rigorous of the models, a $1 increase in the inflation adjusted minimum 
wage is associated with increases of between .41 and .82 percentage points in top income shares. These 
results are highly statistically significant (p<.01). 
Analysis 
The Mystery of Diverging State Trends 
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The models I present above do a good job of explaining why top income shares within states 
grew as much as they did. Model 3, the one-way fixed effects model explains between 72% and 86% of 
the within state changes in top income shares over the last three decades. Model 4, which has the 
additional explanatory power of year dummy variables, explains between 80% and 93% of the within 
state variance. On the other hand, the models I present are fairly ignorant about why state trends have 
diverged. Models 3 and 4 explain between 24% and 36% of the between-state variance in top income 
shares over the last 30 years. To put it in more specific terms, my models do a good job of explaining why 
California’s income share rose in the last 30 years, but a comparatively bad job of explaining why top 
income shares rose more in New York than Delaware. A deeper analysis of the variation between states is 
an important direction for future research in state trends in top income shares.  Even so, explaining 
within-state variation is still theoretically and empirically important. As Table 11 shows, there is more 
variation within states than there is between them. Understanding why income shares have grown so 
significantly within states is therefore a useful way to understand the wider trend of rising top income 
shares in the US. 
Tax Policy Matters, Particularly Capital Gains Taxes 
My results contain strong evidence that tax policy, in particular top marginal tax rates, affect the 
pre-tax income distribution in the United States. Even if reducing top income shares is assumed to be a 
desirable outcome of policy decisions, the policy recommendations that flow from my analysis are far 
from clear. The desirability of raising top marginal tax rates on wages and capital gains depends on the 
mechanism by which such policy changes reduce top income shares. My analysis cannot clearly identify 
how big of a role the three mechanisms (labor supply, tax evasion, and bargaining effects) described by 
Piketty et al. (2011) play in reducing top income shares. Even so, my results provide several insights into 
how tax policies affect pre-tax top income shares.  
Because year fixed effects wash out any changes in federal tax rates, one way to interpret my 
results is to see the first differences and one-way fixed effects models as estimating the effect of the 
combined federal and state top tax rates, while the two-way fixed effect models the effects of year-over-
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year changes in the state tax rate. Model 4 implies that state-level changes in top tax rates on wages have 
very little effect on top income shares, or that there is insufficient variation in tax rates between states to 
identify a significant effect. None of my four model specifications show statistically significant effects in 
the hypothesized direction, and the Frank data set actually shows a large statistically significant effect in 
the wrong direction. This result appears in only one model and runs counter to theory, so it isn’t wise to 
conclude that state changes in top marginal tax rates on wages increase inequality. Instead, I take this as 
strong evidence that year-over-year changes in top state tax rates do not have a large effect on top income 
shares. It’s possible that such effects are at least partially washed out by the deductibility of state income 
taxes; every increase in top marginal state tax rates corresponds with a partially offsetting cut to federal 
income taxes as a result of this deduction. 
While state top marginal tax rates on wages do not appear to significantly reduce top income 
shares, my analysis implies that federal rates do. Models 1-3 do not wash out changes in top marginal 
federal tax rates with year fixed effects. These models largely imply that increases in combined state and 
federal top marginal tax rates are associated with decreases in pre-tax top income shares. These effects are 
most consistent in the Frank data set, which shows statistically significant negative effects in both the first 
differences and state fixed effects models for the income share of both the top 1% and the top 10%. The 
magnitude of these effects varies, but is larger for the top 1% of earners. This makes sense, because every 
individual in the top 1% of earners is likely to pay the top marginal rate, whereas only some of the top 
10% of earners are likely to be subject to the top marginal rate. The data from Sommeiller and Price tells 
a less consistent story.  In Model 3, the state fixed effects model, the Sommeiller and Price data actually 
implies that an increase in the top marginal tax rate on wages is associated with an increase in the income 
share of the top 1%. For the top 10%, the coefficient is in the correct direction, but the effect is less 
significant in Sommeiller and Price than in Frank. Even given this result, the balance of the evidence 
indicates that changes in the federal top marginal tax rate on wages have a negative effect on top income 
shares. This effect is statistically significant and in the right direction in all six of the model/data set 
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combinations for the top 10% of earners (Models 1-3). It is also statistically significant and in the right 
direction in 3 of the five data sets tested of the top 1% of earners. 
The results were much more consistent for top rates on capital gains. Models 1-3 in both data sets 
imply that falling top marginal tax rates on capital gains were associated with rising top income shares. 
The size of this effect was within the same order of magnitude in each data set. Model 4 was once again 
an outlier, in that the coefficients in this model were more than double the largest coefficients observed in 
Models 1-3. If Model 4 measures year over year changes in state taxes on capital gains, it seems strange 
that such changes would be almost twice as large as changes in the combined federal/state tax rate on 
capital gains. Some back of the envelope math reveals that this coefficient is implausibly high. On 
average, states saw top marginal tax rates on capital gains fall by 9.9 percentage points from 1980-2011. 
If the true value of the coefficient was -.5, it would imply that cuts to the capital gains tax caused top 
income shares to rise by 4.96 percentage points, which is about 60% of the average total change in the 
income share of the top 1% over that period (8.20 percentage points).  I hypothesize that this result likely 
reflects tax avoidance effects. Capital is very mobile, particularly between states. It is easy to imagine that 
a high income earner would shift capital out of the state in anticipation of an increase in the capital gains 
tax rate the following year, particularly if she intended to report a capital gain on her taxes. As a result, 
the adjusted gross income reported in the state implementing the tax change would drop the following 
year, reflecting that top earners shifted their capital earnings to other states.  
I additionally find evidence that higher tax rates on high earners could reduce top income shares 
by facilitating additional government expenditures. Volscho and Kelley hypothesize that health and 
education spending in particular help promote human capital formation. Given that state governments’ 
largest budgetary line items are education and Medicaid, it seems plausible that state spending could 
reduce top income shares through this hypothesized mechanism. At the same time, my analysis implies 
that it may be more likely that state government expenditures reduce top income shares through other 
mechanisms. The log state expenditures per capita variable is statistically significant in the first 
differences model and in the two-way fixed effects model using Sommeiller and Price’s data set. Model 2 
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implies that in years when states increase their expenditures, top income shares fall. Model 4 implies that 
in years where states spend more relative to their 30 year average and the nationwide trend for a given 
year, they see decreases in top income shares.  
Given that human capital formation is a long term process, it seems unlikely that it would be 
significantly affected by year over year changes in state expenditures. As a result, Volscho and Kelly’s 
focus on human capital formation as a mechanism for reducing top income shares seems unlikely. There 
are a number of ways that government expenditures could reduce top income shares through shorter term 
mechanisms. State capital expenditures could result in jobs or higher wages for middle class construction 
workers. State expenditures on current operations could similarly increase wage incomes in the middle 
and bottom of the income distribution by directly hiring public sector workers. While my data cannot 
identify the precise mechanism through which state can reduce top income shares, future analysis could 
seek to test identify such a mechanism by testing which categories of state expenditures are most closely 
associated with reductions in top income shares. 
The College Wage Premium Matters  
My results from the college wage premium are mostly quite robust. The only model which 
implies that the college wage premium does not play a role in rising income shares is the first differences 
model. Because the college wage premium variable was built using the coefficients from a previous 
regression equation, it is possible that there was more year-over-year random fluctuation due to 
measurement error, which could explain why the results from Model 2 were insignificant. The OLS and 
one-way fixed effects model consistently showed that the college wage premium increased top income 
shares, and the two-way fixed effects model found a statistically significant result using the Someiller and 
Price data set for the top 10% of earners. Because Model 4 contains the strictest controls for omitted 
variable bias, we can say with a high degree of confidence that there appears to be a relationship between 
the wage premium and the income share of the top 10%.  
At the same time, my models imply that the college wage premium appears to have a smaller 
effect on the income share of the top 1%. This result has a lot of intuitive validity, for at least two reasons. 
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First, it seems likely at least some of the wages of workers in the top 1% are reflective of abilities or skills 
beyond just their education, and as a result, such workers may see relatively less benefit from rising 
returns to education. The top 1% of earners made about $350,000 in 2011 (Sommeiller and Price 2014). 
In 2005, the largest occupational categories of individuals in the top 1% were executives (30.0%), doctors 
(14.2%), financial workers (13.2%) and lawyers (7.7%)  (Bakija, Cole, and Heim 2012, 35). While such 
individuals certainly accrue some benefits from an economy that increasingly rewards college-educated 
workers, their compensation is high enough that it also reflects that they have special abilities, skills or 
occupational specializations. Most managers, doctors and lawyers don’t make $350,000; the salaries of 
the highest paid individuals in such professions are likely not primarily as a function of skill-based 
technological change. 
In addition to occupational characteristics, the top 10% of earners is likely to benefit more from 
the college wage premium than the top 1% because it represents a larger portion of all college education 
workers. In 2011, for example, the about 26.6% of the residents of the average state had college degrees 
or higher, according to the MORG data used for my analysis.11 A large portion of the top 1% and 10% of 
earners are likely to have college degrees. To illustrate this point, imagine that the entirety of each 
population is college educated. In that case, the top 1% of earners would represent a much smaller share 
of the college educated population (about 3.8%) than the top 10% of earners (36.6%). The dependent 
variable in my analysis is a proportion—the income share of top earners divided by the income share of 
all earners. The returns to higher education received by the returns college educated workers outside of 
the top 1% or 10% would be represented in the denominator. Because the top 10% of earners represents a 
larger portion of all college educated workers, a larger relative share of the total returns to education are 
included in the numerator. As a result, we would expect the income share of the top 10% to be more 
sensitive to increases in the college wage premium. In this context, my results make a lot of sense. 
Evidence for Unionization is Unconvincing 
                                                            
11 This is not population-weighted, so it does not represent the share of all Americans with college degrees. 
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Unionization was only statistically significant in the least empirically rigorous OLS model and 
the first differences model. While the first differences model at least controls for time invariant 
heterogeneity between states, it is still susceptible to omitted variable bias from common trends in time. 
Unlike tax rates, unionization did not bounce up and down over the past 30 years; it declined steadily. 
While top income shares did bounce around during the 2000s, their path has been a mostly consistent 
trend upward over the same period. Union membership rarely grew, and top income shares rarely fell. 
The statistical significance in the first differences model may merely reflect a spurious correlation 
resulting from the steadiness of the trend in both variables. As such, the lack of statistical significance in 
Model 4 is particularly concerning for advocates of the unionization explanation of rising top income 
shares. This is especially true given the large between and within state variance observed in the union 
membership variable; the lack of significance in Model 4 can’t be explained away due to low variance 
and the resulting lack of explanatory power (as was the case for the top marginal tax rate variables). 
Finally, even if we accept the results of the first differences model, the effect of unionization is quite 
small. Union membership fell by an average of 10.28 percentage points from 1980-2011. Using the 
estimates from the first differences model, this implies that union membership was responsible for an 
increase of .59 percentage points in the income share of the top 1% and .34 percentage points in the 
income share of the top 10%.  
Democratic Governors Have a Small Effect, if Any 
My analysis find slight evidence that the presence of a Democratic governor in a given state and 
year reduces top income shares. This variable is only significant in four of the fourteen models I tested, 
and it is only significant at the ߙ ൌ .05 level in two. Even so, the signs on the coefficients are consistently 
negative, and the effects on the income share of both the top 1% and 10% appear to be consistently 
between -.75 and 0. These results are mostly interesting from a theoretical perspective. If there is any 
evidence that Democratic governors reduce top income shares, that’s a sign that there are policy variables 
that reduce top income shares that are not captured by my model. My model contains controls for a 
number of different state policy choices, including total taxes collected, total state spending, state tax rates 
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on top earners and the minimum wage. The potential significance of the governor’s partisanship implies 
that future research into the effects of state government policies on top income shares may be fruitful. 
The Minimum Wage 
Very low income workers receive an extremely small share of total income in a state, and I am 
therefore not surprised that my models imply that the minimum wage does not appear to reduce top 
income shares. The minimum wage’s main goal is to lift up incomes at the bottom of the distribution, 
rather than reduce incomes of those at the top. Even if wage increases in low-income workers were a 
direct transfer from top earners, it is unlikely that such increases would be statistically detectable. One 
analysis showed that increasing the federal minimum wage to $10.10 in 2011 would provide an additional 
$35 billion in income to low wage workers nationwide (Cooper 2013). Even if that change would be 
meaningful for Americans earning the minimum wage, that total represents about .2% of the 
approximately $13 billion in personal income earned in the United Sates in the year 2011 (Bureau Of 
Economic Analysis 2014). Minimum wage workers are a relatively small share of the population, and by 
definition they earn very little income. Changes in their economic situation have very little bearing on the 
income shares of top earners. 
The relatively small effect of lower wage workers on the total income distribution makes the 
results I received for the minimum wage confusing. The two-way fixed effects model implies that 
increases in the minimum wage are associated with rising top income shares in three of the four versions 
of Model 4 tested. Given that this model contains the most rigorous controls for omitted variable bias, 
these results are difficult to explain. Even if the minimum wage caused significant disemployment effects, 
my model controls for the unemployment rate in a given state and year, meaning that some other 
mechanism is driving this effect. Such a result is more than likely a spurious correlation between the 
minimum wage and top income shares, or with some other factor. One potential explanation is cost of 
living. States with high costs of living such as New York and California may be particularly attractive to 
higher income earners, and the presence of such earners may drive up the cost of living by increasing the 
demand for higher end goods and services. States may feel compelled to increase the minimum wage to 
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respond to the higher cost of living, which could cause a spurious correlation between the minimum wage 
and top income shares.  
Conclusion 
As income inequality has grown in political salience, explanations for rising top income shares 
have proliferated. If policymakers aim to reverse this trend, it will be important that academic literature 
clearly identify whether policy decisions have the capacity to reduce or reverse the trend of rising top 
income shares. Analyzing the historical evidence of the effects of policy changes has the potential to 
identify which policies matter the most, and which would be most effective in altering the trend of rising 
inequality in the future. The 50 states differ greatly in their policy regimes and market decisions. As a 
result, they can be extremely helpful in explanting whether past policy decisions have affected trends in 
income inequality. They can also help identify how much particular market forces are contributing to this 
trend.  
Given the lack of existing scholarship that aims to analyze the effects of policy and market 
conditions on income inequality on the state level, this paper is a methodological proof of concept that 
focusing on the states can yield important insights with policy implications. By analyzing the trends in the 
states, I identified strong evidence that raising top marginal tax rates can reduce pre-tax income shares of 
top earners. I confirmed that growing returns to college education have also contributed to rising top 
income shares. I presented evidence that declining unionization is not the most important cause of rising 
top income shares, and that the size of the financial sector has almost no effect. I showed that the effect of 
the minimum wage on top income shares is ambiguous, but it is unlikely that raising the wage will have a 
noticeable effect at the top of the income distribution.  
Policymakers who wish to implement policies that reduce the income shares of top earners should 
take several lessons from my analysis. First, tax policy seems like a much more promising mechanism for 
reducing inequality than other solutions commonly proposed. Raising the minimum wage, reigning in the 
growth of the financial sector or encouraging union membership may be desirable policies for any 
number of reasons. They may even reduce inequality as measured by GINI coefficient or the 90-10 wage 
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gap, but my analysis implies that there is little evidence that such policies reduce top income shares. 
Inequality is not a single phenomenon, and as such does not have a single policy solution. There is very 
strong evidence that top income shares have grown dramatically over the last 30 years, and policymakers 
wishing to reverse this trend will need to identify which policy tools are likely to be effective. Of the 
variables I considered, tax policy is likely to be the most efficacious route to reducing top income shares, 
even if their direct effects on after-tax income are ignored. 
Second, federal capital gains taxes in particular appear to be particularly effective in reducing top 
income shares. Of all the variables I tested, higher top marginal tax rates on capital gains were most 
consistently associated with reductions in top income shares. These effects were of a similar size in 
Models 1-3, indicating that my results for this variable were consistent as well as robust. The fact that 
Model 4 showed effects that were around three times larger than in Models 1-3 implied that there is 
significant evidence that attempting to implement reduce top income shares through changes in state 
capital gains tax rates may be ineffectual. State taxes on capital gains are easier to evade than federal, 
because state borders are more porous to capital than are federal borders. My analysis implies that 
policymakers and advocacy groups who wish to reduce top income shares without causing significant tax 
evasion ought to focus their attention on federal capital gains tax rates.  
Third, the effects of top marginal tax rates on wages were more mixed in my models, but they 
still imply that increases in both federal and state tax rates on wages could help reduce top income shares. 
Unlike with capital gains tax rates, there was little evidence that top marginal state tax rates on wages 
were provoking tax evasion. The coefficients on the wage tax rate variable actually appeared to move in 
the opposite direction from the coefficients on the capital gains variable in Model 4. Unlike with capital 
gains, states that changed their top tax rates on wages did not see large drops in the income share of the 
top 1%, implying that there was little attempt to evade such taxes by leaving the state. At the same time, 
increases in state top marginal tax rates on wages did not appear to significantly reduce top income shares 
in my model. This result has important, but nuanced policy consequences. State tax rates on wages are 
unlikely to be an effective mechanism for reducing pre-tax top income shares through their behavioral 
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effects on top earners. As with capital gains taxes, my analysis implies that the federal government is a 
more appropriate target for advocacy groups who aim to reduce pre-tax top income shares through such 
channels. At the same time, my analysis implies state policymakers may be able to raise top marginal 
income tax rates without provoking significant changes in the behavior of top earners, either through 
reduced labor supply or tax evasion. Such tax increases would certainly reduce the post-tax income shares 
of top earners, and to the extent that they finance additional state government expenditures, they may 
actually reduce pre-tax top income shares as well. 
Fourth, the results of my analysis for the college wage premium to some extent confirms existing 
literature that suggests that the college wage premium has played a role in rising inequality. Still, this 
result is noteworthy in that it offers empirical support for the idea that growing returns to education may 
be affecting inequality as measured by top income shares. Hacker and Pierson (2011), for example, argue 
that returns to education may explain growth in other measures of inequality, but it cannot explain 
growing income shares for top earners.12 My analysis provides evidence to the contrary, at least on this 
point. Hacker and Pierson additionally argue that inequality within groups of workers with the same 
levels of education has also grown, which indicates that skill based technological change alone cannot 
explain growing top income shares. While this explanation is also plausible, it does not preclude the 
possibility that the growing college wage premium has disproportionately benefited workers in the top 
1% and top 10% of earners; it may even corroborate such a hypothesis.  
My analysis indicates that the income share of the top 1% and 10% of workers increases as the 
college wage premium grows, even though such workers represent fewer than half of all college educated 
workers. This suggests that the growing average gap in average wages between college educated and non-
college educated workers has particularly benefited those at the top of the income distribution. This 
implies that policies which merely encourage more workers to get college educations may not be 
successful in reducing top income shares, because not all workers benefit from a college education to the 
                                                            
12 Importantly, Hacker and Pierson point to the role of policy in shaping the pre-tax income distribution. My results 
on tax policy largely corroborate this part of their argument. 
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same degree as top earners. Indeed, the variable in my models for the share of workers with college 
degrees was not consistently significant. Going forward, further research will be helpful in identifying 
what role education has played in growing top income shares. My analysis is not fine-grained enough to 
identify precisely who benefits from growing returns to college education, and how such returns shape the 
overall distribution of income.  
Finally, my analysis implies that most common explanations for rising inequality can explain 
changes in top income shares within states over time, but we know very little about what makes state 
income distributions different from one another. While between-state variation in income inequality is a 
mystery as of my analysis, it has the potential to be extremely policy relevant. Future research has the 
potential to uncover what policy, market, or demographic factors have made a state’s income distribution 
equal relative to other states. The old cliché calls the states the laboratories of democracy; future research 
may reveal that the states can also be laboratories of equality. 
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Appendix 1: Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1: Income Shares of Top Earners in the United States, 1920-2012 
 
 
Trends in income shares in Piketty and Saez. Updated data from Saez (2013) 
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Figure 2: Comparing Estimates of the Income Share of the Top 1% of Earners 
Data from Emmanuel Saez (2013) Kopczuk, Saez and Song (2010) (augmented by Mishel and Finio(2014)), the 
Congressional Budget Office (2013), Frank (2009), and Sommeiller and Price (2014). I calculated a nationwide 
average from Frank’s state level data by weighting states by population. While their data set is also state level, 
Sommeiller and Price provide their own estimate of the nationwide trend. 
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Figure 3: State Trends in Top 1% Income Shares, 1980-2010 
 
Data from Frank (2009). 
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Table 1: Variation in Top Income Shares has Grown Significantly Since 1980 
  1980   2011 
  Top 1% Income Share 
Smallest Share Alaska: 5.8%  Hawaii: 11.5% 
Largest Share Texas: 10.4%  New York: 27.5% 
       
Range 4.6%   16.0% 
Standard Deviation 1.1%   3.6% 
Data from Frank (2009). 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Tension between Variation and Omitted Variable Bias 
 Model 1: Pooled OLS Models 2 & 3: First 
Differences and Fixed 
Effects 
Model 4: Two-way fixed 
effects 
Variance High between and 
within group variance 
Low between group variance, 
high within group variance. 
Low within and between group 
variance. 
Omitted 
Variable 
Bias 
High risk of omitted 
variable bias due to 
time invariant 
characteristics of states 
and unobserved time 
trends. 
Low risk of omitted variable 
bias due to time invariant 
characteristics of states. High 
risk of bias due to unobserved 
time trends. 
Low risk of omitted variable 
bias due to time invariant state 
characteristics or unobserved 
time trends. Still at risk of 
omitted variable bias due to 
time variant characteristics. 
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Table 3: Variables Included and Summary Statistics 
         Range  Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Source    Min. Max.  Mean St. Dev.
            
Dependent Variables           
Top 1% Income Share (Frank) (Frank 2009)    5.75 28.24  14.21 4.21
Top 1% Income Share (S&P) (Sommeiller and Price 2014)    4.34 33.35  14.44 4.34
Top 10% Income Share (Frank) (Frank 2009)    28.48 54.63  38.90 5.07
Top 10% Income Share (S&P) (Sommeiller and Price 2014)    25.08 61.04  40.59 5.20
            
Tax Variables           
Top Marginal Tax Rate (Wages) (Feenberg 1993)    28 56.9  42.69 6.68
Top Marginal Tax Rate (Capital 
Gains) (Feenberg 1993)    11.24 29.19  20.58 5.26
            
Education Variables           
College Wage Premium (Center for Economic and Policy Research 2014)    0.098 0.654  0.399 0.091
% w/Bachelor's Degrees (Center for Economic and Policy Research 2014)    7.39 50.34  20.56 5.69
            
Controls           
Log Taxes Per Capita (United States Census Bureau 2013)    6.57 9.53  7.67 0.31
Log State Expend. Per Capita (United States Census Bureau 2014)    7.61 9.88  8.44 0.35
Union Membership (Hirsch and Macpherson 2003)    2.3 38.3  14.23 6.66
Minimum Wage (UKCPR 2014)    3.1 8.67  4.81 1.37
Log Personal Income Per Capita (UKCPR 2014)    9.86 11.21  10.43 0.21
Unemployment Rate (UKCPR 2014)    2.3 17.4  6.04 2.15
Finance Share of GDP (US Department of Commerce 2014)    1.44 37.33  6.44 4.09
Governor is a Democrat (UKCPR 2014)    0 1  0.51 0.50
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Figure 4: Comparing Panel Data Sets from Frank (2009) and Sommeiller/Price (2014) 
Data from Frank (2009) and Sommeiller/Price(2014) 
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Table 4: Mean Differences between Sommeiller and Price and Frank Data Sets By State 
Mean Difference 
(Frank - SP) 
Mean Difference 
(Frank - SP) 
State  Top 1 Top 10 State  Top 1 Top 10
Connecticut -4.14 -3.87 Oregon 0.36 -1.79
New York -2.57 -2.93 Vermont 0.46 -1.63
Massachusetts -1.85 -3.26 Kentucky 0.51 -2.59
New Jersey -1.78 -3.05 South Carolina 0.53 -1.92
Florida -1.75 -2.78 Wisconsin 0.53 -1.42
Nevada -1.39 -1.83 North Carolina 0.53 -0.76
District of 
Columbia -1.04 1.42 Missouri 0.64 -1.14
Illinois -0.73 -1.73 Louisiana 0.65 -0.92
California -0.66 -0.78 Ohio 0.69 -1.29
Delaware -0.49 -2.19 Indiana 0.70 -1.82
Arizona -0.41 -2.58 Maine 0.74 -1.63
Washington -0.36 -2.22 Arkansas 0.80 -1.73
Rhode Island -0.27 -2.86 Mississippi 0.96 -2.01
New Hampshire -0.23 -1.92 Kansas 0.98 0.28
West Virginia -0.18 -6.48 Utah 1.02 0.55
Pennsylvania -0.07 -2.14 New Mexico 1.04 -0.82
Maryland -0.07 -1.01 Oklahoma 1.22 0.62
Michigan -0.04 -3.55 Montana 1.25 -0.04
Georgia 0.06 -1.14 Iowa 1.55 0.70
Colorado 0.16 -0.09 Idaho 1.57 1.21
Minnesota 0.17 -0.90 North Dakota 1.61 1.15
Virginia 0.21 -0.52 Hawaii 1.85 2.68
Alabama 0.27 -2.80 Nebraska 1.97 2.65
Texas 0.28 0.31 Alaska 2.18 5.28
Wyoming 0.32 0.72 South Dakota 2.24 3.37
Tennessee 0.33 -1.51
US Average -0.62 -1.91
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Table 5: Variation in Top Marginal Tax Rates Between and Within States (Combined State and 
Federal) 
Top Marginal Tax Rate (Wages)   Top Marginal Tax Rate (Capital Gains) 
  Overall Between Within Overall Between  Within 
St. Dev.  6.7 1.9 6.4  5.6 1.6 5.4
Minimum 28.0 39.5 29.2  15.0 22.2 15
Maximum 56.9 45.8 55.1  37.0 28.1 35.1
Between and within values calculated using Stata’s xtsum command. Within variation measures the extent to which top tax rtes 
deviate from their average value across the 31 years included in my analysis. Between variation measures the extent to which 
states vary from the average value across all states in a given year.  
 
Figure 5: Variation in Top Marginal Tax Rates on Wages 
 
Source: Feenberg 1993 
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Figure 6: Log College Wage Premium by US State, 1980-2010 
 
 
Table 6: Variation in Union Membership Between and Within States 
  Overall Between Within 
St. Dev.  6.7 5.9 3.2
Minimum 2.3 4.6 6.6
Maximum 38.3 27.6 34
 
Table 7: Variation in Finance Share of GDP Between and Within States 
  Overall Between Within 
St. Dev.  4.1 3.6 2.0
Minimum 1.4 2.7 -13.1
Maximum 37.3 25.5 18.3
Between and within values calculated using Stata’s xtsum command. Within variation measures the extent to which union 
membership and finance shares deviate from their average value across the 31 years included in my analysis. Between variation 
measures the extent to which states vary from the average value across all states in a given year.  
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Table 8: Results for the Income Share of the Top 1% 
  Model 1: OLS   Model 2: FD   Model 3: One-Way FE   Model 4: Two-Way FE 
Data Set Frank S&P   Frank   Frank S&P   Frank S&P 
Tax Variables                     
Top Marginal Tax Rate -0.126*** -0.00851   -0.0906***   -0.0981*** 0.0312***   0.287 0.476 
(Wages) (0.0219) (0.0254)   (0.00498)   (0.00911) (0.0112)   (0.180) (0.347) 
                      
Top Marginal Tax Rate -0.243*** -0.133***   -0.0973***   -0.209*** -0.0872***   -0.504*** -0.585*** 
(Capital Gains) (0.0280) (0.0330)   (0.00758)   (0.0202) (0.0162)   (0.107) (0.149) 
                      
Log Taxes Per Capita 0.885 0.902   1.882   0.224 -0.00446   0.00431 0.65 
  (1.128) (1.343)   (1.151)   (1.150) (0.983)   (0.534) (0.617) 
                  
Log State Expend. Per Capita -0.138 -2.439   -2.797***   -1.463 -2.637   -1.92 -4.974** 
  (1.179) (1.660)   (0.584)   (1.197) (1.687)   (1.504) (2.209) 
Education Variables                     
College Wage Premium 7.214* 10.05*   0.921   6.642*** 10.06***   1.666 3.443 
  (3.921) (5.484)   (0.761)   (1.984) (2.413)   (1.747) (2.322) 
                      
% w/Bachelor's Degrees -0.157 -0.239*   -0.043   -0.0215 0.065   -0.138 -0.033 
  (0.0981) (0.138)   (0.0341)   (0.0886) (0.124)   (0.0843) (0.136) 
Other Variables                     
Union Membership -0.0810* -0.0831   -0.0576***   -0.036 -0.0512   -0.0295 0.00865 
  (0.0457) (0.0705)   (0.0188)   (0.0487) (0.0692)   (0.0382) (0.0548) 
                      
Finance Share of GDP 0.024 0.057   0.163 0.0793 0.151   0.0364 0.0995 
  (0.0769) (0.0944)   (0.113)   (0.0627) (0.0989)   (0.0509) (0.0931) 
                      
Minimum Wage -0.726*** 0.125   -0.349***   -0.671*** 0.233*   -0.225 0.568** 
  (0.230) (0.290)   (0.0888)   (0.138) (0.121)   (0.147) (0.229) 
                      
Governor is a Democrat -0.308 -0.386   -0.014   -0.19 -0.314*   -0.0738 -0.128 
  (0.192) (0.265)   (0.0809)   (0.159) (0.177)   (0.114) (0.156) 
                      
Log Personal Income Per Capita 10.46*** 18.03***   8.650***   13.09*** 13.52**   9.147*** 10.55** 
  (3.345) (4.854)   (2.192)   (3.523) (5.166)   (2.705) (4.391) 
                      
Unemployment Rate -0.152* 0.068   -0.225***   -0.240*** -0.228**   0.151* 0.00293 
  (0.0808) (0.0999)   (0.0381)   (0.0680) (0.0877)   (0.0793) (0.0950) 
                      
State Fixed Effects           X X   X X 
Year Fixed Effects                 X X 
                      
N 1600 1450   1550   1600 1450   1600 1450 
R-Squared 0.69 0.602   0.213   0.645 0.537   0.793 0.627 
R-Squared Within           0.786 0.723   0.879 0.810 
R-Squared Between           0.242 0.317   0.347 0.358 
Legend: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and by 
clustering standard errors by state. Year fixed effects were added to Model 4 using year dummy variables. State fixed effects implemented using Stata’s xtreg 
command, which applies fixed effects through demeaning. 
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Table 9: Results for the Income Share of the Top 10% 
  Model 1: OLS   Model 2: FD   Model 3: One-Way FE   Model 4: Two-Way FE 
Data Set Frank S&P   Frank   Frank S&P   Frank S&P 
Tax Variables                     
Top Marginal Tax Rate -0.128*** -0.0423   -0.100***   -0.0805*** -0.0281*   0.475** 0.459 
(Wages) (0.0274) (0.0299)   (0.00542)   (0.0118) (0.0143)   (0.225) (0.373) 
                      
Top Marginal Tax Rate -0.0803** -0.118***   -0.0575***   -0.0285* -0.0962***   -0.518*** -0.646*** 
(Capital Gains) (0.0310) (0.0418)   (0.00575)   (0.0157) (0.0216)   (0.113) (0.193) 
                      
Log Taxes Per Capita -0.00121 0.986   1.075   -1.361 -0.328   -0.513 0.810 
  (1.575) (1.580)   (0.872)   (0.984) (1.140)   (0.532) (0.761) 
                    
Log State Expend. Per Capita 0.407 -2.895   -1.241**   -0.0311 -1.503 -1.562 -4.807** 
  (1.306) (1.969)   (0.572)   (1.381) (1.918)   (1.697) (2.309) 
Education Variables                     
College Wage Premium 13.33*** 25.21***   1   9.779*** 15.01***   2.892 6.273** 
  (4.046) (5.797)   (0.667)   (2.330) (2.741)   (1.754) (2.660) 
                      
% w/Bachelor's Degrees -0.105 -0.132   -0.013   0.165 0.136   0.0361 0.00644 
  (0.101) (0.141)   (0.0287)   (0.114) (0.122)   (0.112) (0.134) 
Other Variables                     
Union Membership -0.151** -0.062   -0.0330*   -0.096 -0.109   -0.038 0.019 
  (0.0593) (0.0762)   (0.0187)   (0.0592) (0.0775)   (0.0536) (0.0655) 
                      
Finance Share of GDP 0.0058 0.0592   0.11   0.100 0.158   0.0525 0.107 
  (0.0923) (0.101)   (0.0744)   (0.0853) (0.114)   (0.0649) (0.107) 
                      
Minimum Wage 0.028 0.144   -0.113**   0.0596 0.205   0.410** 0.826*** 
  (0.268) (0.376)   (0.0493)   (0.110) (0.162)   (0.178) (0.270) 
                      
Governor is a Democrat -0.630*** -0.261   -0.036   -0.490*** -0.377*   -0.207 -0.186 
  (0.225) (0.320)   (0.0468)   (0.165) (0.204)   (0.128) (0.185) 
                      
Log Personal Income Per Capita 14.91*** 14.56***   6.944***   14.70*** 10.34*   8.489*** 3.962 
  (3.564) (4.847)   (1.658)   (3.902) (5.316)   (3.117) (4.811) 
                      
Unemployment Rate -0.006 0.368***   -0.194***   -0.235*** -0.0756   0.0629 0.011 
  (0.0829) (0.125)   (0.0306)   (0.0736) (0.102)   (0.0744) (0.109) 
                      
State Fixed Effects           X X   X X 
Year Fixed Effects                 X X 
                      
N 1600 1450   1550   1600 1450   1600 1450 
R-Squared 0.764 0.614   0.263   0.703 0.534   0.785 0.567 
R-Squared Within           0.886 0.741   0.936 0.799 
R-Squared Between           0.309 0.276   0.296 0.298 
Legend: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and by 
clustering standard errors by state. Year fixed effects were added to Model 4 using year dummy variables. State fixed effects implemented using Stata’s xtreg 
command, which applies fixed effects through demeaning. 
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Table 10: Results from Model 2 using S&P Data set 
Model 2: Sommeiller and Price 
  Top 1% Top 10% 
Top Marginal Tax Rate (Wages) -0.0378*** -0.0653*** 
(0.00617) (0.00932) 
Top Marginal Tax Rate (Capital Gains) -0.199*** -0.165*** 
(0.0120) (0.0175) 
Log Taxes Per Capita 0.417 1.186 
  (0.871) (1.155) 
Log State Expend. Per Capita -0.0666 0.431 
  (1.130) (1.267) 
College Wage Premium 2.264* 1.834 
  (1.286) (1.419) 
% w/Bachelor's Degrees -0.0444 -0.0767 
  (0.0496) (0.0504) 
Union Membership -0.0619* -0.0611 
  (0.0323) (0.0374) 
Finance Share of GDP 0.0942 0.0986 
  (0.175) (0.200) 
Governor is a Democrat 0.129 0.164 
  (0.106) (0.108) 
Minimum Wage 0.0613 -0.136 
  (0.0877) (0.104) 
Log Personal Income Per Capita 8.002* -4.845 
  (4.528) (5.988) 
Unemployment Rate -0.317*** -0.243*** 
  (0.0553) (0.0826) 
_cons 0.0434 0.285*** 
  (0.0535) (0.0654) 
R^2  0.195 0.0895 
N 1350 1350 
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Table 11: Between and Within Variation of Top Income Shares 
Top 1% Income Share (Frank)   Top 1% Income Share (S&P) 
  Overall Between Within Overall Between  Within 
St. Dev.  4.21 1.73 3.85  4.34 2.80 3.33
Minimum 5.75 11.63 19.23  5.13 9.81 22.22
Maximum 28.24 19.23 25.05  33.35 22.22 26.81
Top 10% Income Share (Frank)   Top 10% Income Share (S&P) 
  Overall Between Within Overall Between  Within 
St. Dev.  5.07 2.60 4.37 5.20 3.48 3.90
Minimum 28.48 34.62 26.39 25.08 32.98 24.48
Maximum 54.63 45.82 49.72 61.04 49.76 53.95
Between and within values calculated using Stata’s xtsum command. Within variation measures the extent to which top income 
shares deviate from their average value across the 31 years included in my analysis. Between variation measures the extent to 
which states vary from the average value across all states in a given year.  
 
